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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a capital case; it is literally a matter of life and death for Azad Abdullah. On
appeal, Mr. Abdullah is challenging his judgment of conviction and death sentence, as well as
the district court's order denying him post-conviction relief
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously set forth in
Mr. Abdullah's Second Revised Appellant-Petitioner's Brief (hereinafter "Appellant's Br.").
They need not be repeated here, but are incorvorated by reference. (Appellant's Br. 1-5.)
References to the Respondent's Brief will be cited herein as "Resp. Br."
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Abdullah objects to the State's attempt to dictate which
issues it believes he should be permitted to raise on appeal by "rephrasing" the issues on appeal
(Resp. Br. 10-14), a mechanism not recognized by this Court's rules. Presumably, the State did
not believe its "rephrased" issues warranted a cross-appeal, as none was filed. See Idaho
Appellate Rule (IAR) l 5(a) (permitting a timely cross-appeal where reversal, vacation or
modification of a judgment is sought); cf State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365, 373 (2004) (finding
State's request that appellate court affirm conviction and suppression order on different legal
theory than that relied upon by district court is not a request for affirmative relief and is properly
brought as an additional issue on appeal rather than a cross-appeal from the order).
Similarly, it appears the State did not believe its "wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal"
were compelling enough to comply with IAR 35(b)(4): "In the event the respondent contends
that the issues presented on appeal listed in the appellant's brief are insufficient, incomplete, or
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raise additional issues for review, the respondent may list additional issues presented on
appeal .... " (emphasis added); Fisher, 140 Idaho at 373 ("Therefore the State does not seek
affirmative relief and properly brought the issue as an additional issue on appeal instead of being
required to cross appeal from the previous district court order."). That the "state wishes to
rephrase the issues on appeal" is not a contention that the issues presented in Mr. Abdullah's
Brief "are insufficient, incomplete, or raise additional issues for review[.]" Instead, it is an
expression of the State's attempt to dictate which issues Mr. Abdullah, the non-prevailing party,
will be allowed to raise on appeal, and which issues this Court can consider. Mr. Abdullah
objects to the State's attempts to change the issues on appeal through an unrecognized, improper
procedure, and urges this Court to simply address the issues Mr. Abdullah has raised on appeal.
ISSUES
GUILT PHASE ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL

I.

III.
IV.
VI.
VII.

VIII.

IX.
X.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Azad's Fomieenth Amendment
Rights To Equal Protection And Due Process When It Denied His Repeated Requests For
Funding For A Defense DNA Expert
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's First
Degree Murder Conviction
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's First
Degree Arson Conviction
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's Conviction
Of Felony Injury To A Child
The District Court Erred In Providing The Jury With A Single Definition Of Willfully
That Was Wrong With Respect To All Charged Offenses Except Arson, Effectively
Reducing The State's Burden Of Proving Mr. Abdullah Guilty Of All Elements Of The
Charged Offenses Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The District Court Erred In Admitting Angie's Statements To Her Lawyer And Doctor
Over Mr. Abdullah's Objection, Where Such Statements Were Irrelevant And
Constituted Improper Character Evidence That Was More Prejudicial Than Probative
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Statements Made by
Mr. Abdullah That Were Irrelevant and Unfairly Prejudicial
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Allow The Jury To Hear
Evidence Of Angie's Life Insurance Policy Where Mr. Abdullah Was Not A Beneficiary
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XIV.

The District Court's Finding That There Are No Grounds To Challenge The Legality Of
The Term Of The Grand Jury That Indicted Mr. Abdullah Is Clearly Erroneous And Not
Supported By The Record
ISSUES ON POST-CONVfCTION APPEAL

I.

VIL

XIII.

XIV.

The District Court Erred In Applying An Incorrect Standard To The Prejudice Portion Of
Mr. Abdullah's Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Denying Mr. Abdullah
Postconviction Relief
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Abdullah's Claim That He Was
Denied His Sixth Amendment Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Counsels'
Failure To Investigate, Prepare And Present An Adequate Case [n Mitigation
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Abdullah's Claims That He Was Denied His
Sixth Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Counsels' Improper
Advisements Regarding His Right To Testify At The Guilt And Penalty Phase, And To
Allocute
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Abdullah's Claim That His Sixth Amendment
Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Was Violated By Counsels' Failure To
Conduct Adequate Voir Dire, Failure To Strike Biased Jurors For Cause And Failing To
Utilize Peremptory Strikes To Remove The Most Biased Jurors
ARGUMENT
Direct Appeal Issues 1
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion And Violated Mr. Abdullah's Fourteenth
Amendment Rights To Equal Protection And Due Process When It Denied His Repeated
Requests For Funding For A Defense DNA Expert
The district court abused its discretion and violated Mr. Abdullah's Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process rights by denying his repeated and reasonable
requests to fund a defense DNA expert. Both the district court below and the State on appeal
seem to believe that in order to receive funding for a DNA expert at trial, a defendant must first
prove the State's DNA testing is flawed, the results are inculpatory, and the DNA evidence is the

1Where

a reply to specific claims is not necessitated by the Respondent's Brief, Mr. Abdullah
relies on his prior briefing. For those issues which require a response, for the sake of consistency
and ease ofreference, Mr. Abdullah relies on the same numbering as in his Appellant's Brief.
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only evidence linking a defendant to the charged crime(s). (Resp. Br. 1 17.) How a defendant
can be expected to make these pre-trial showings about scientific evidence without the benefit of
a DNA expert is unclear.

2

It is the anosognosic's dilemma; how do you know what you do not

know?
What we do know is that when the court denied Mr. Abdullah's requests for a DNA
expert, it knew the State intended to rely upon DNA testing results, and in fact did so at trial, not
to exculpate Mr. Abdullah, but to inculpate him. If the DNA testing results were so obviously
exculpatory, as the district court concluded when it denied Mr. Abdullah's request, the results
could not have figured so prominently in the State's case as they did. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.995,
L.ll -p.108, L.21; Vol .VIII, p.101, L.8

p.102, L.l

p.124, L.18--p.125, L.6.)

Without the assistance of a defense DNA expert to testify at trial or advise the defense
about DNA testing that could have or should have been done, and to explain the science
underlying the State expert's interpretation of the DNA test results, the best the defense could do
was reiterate, through cross-examination of the State's expert, that Mr. Abdullah was excluded as
a major contributor to the DNA on the cape, but not excluded as a minor contributor. (Id. Vol.VI,
p.1022, Ls.4-12.) The defense was without adequate information or knowledge of DNA testing
to challenge the prosecutor's fallacious hypothetical of what the DNA results represented.
The State's expert testified "[t]he probability of randomly selecting an unrelated
individual with the DNA profile consistent with the reportable DNA profile from the cape prep

2

Post-conviction investigation debunked the conclusion of a "match" and confirmed that but for
the State expert's erroneous interpretation of the DNA results, those results could have been
deemed exclusionary or exculpatory by a defense expert, not inculpatory. (R.39417, pp. 45264531.)

4

one 1s I in 16,000." (id. Vol. VI, p.101

Ls.8-14.) The prosecutor summarized the expert's

testimony as "those four markers, the probability of random selection in this most recent
database covering Middle Eastern populations isl in 16,000[.]" (Id., p.1017, Ls.15-17.) The
prosecutor then erroneously applied this random match probability to the population of Boise,
assuming a population of 250,000 people. (Id., p. l 0 17, Ls.19-24.) The prosecutor proposed a
hypothetical to the State's DNA expert regarding the random match probability, which
ultimately resulted in the expert agreeing only 10 men, of the 250,000 people in Boise, could be
possible contributors to the combined, partial DNA profile found at the scene. (Id., p.1016,
L.24 - p. l 0 18, L. 15.) The hypothetical was erroneous.
The prosecutor's fallacy is the assumption that the random match
probability is the same as the probability that the defendant was not the source of
the DNA sample .... [n other words, if a juror is told the probability a member of
the general population would share the same DNA is l in 10,000 (ran,dom match
probability), and he takes that to mean there is only a 1 in 10,000 chance that
someone other than the defendant is the source of the DNA found at the crime
scene (source probability), then he has succumbed to the prosecutor's fallacy. It is
further error to equate source probability with probability of guilt, unless there is
no explanation other than guilt for a person to be the source of crime-scene DNA.
This faulty reasoning may result in an erroneous statement that, based on a
random match probability of 1 in 10,000, there is a .01 % chance the defendant is
innocent or a 99.99% chance the defendant is guilty.

McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 128 (2010); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.2d 1144,
1157-58 (9 th Cir. 1994) ("[S]uppose the FBI's evidence establishes that there is a one in 10,000
chance of a random match. The jury might equate this likelihood with source probability by
believing that there is a one in 10,000 chance that the evidentiary sample did not come from the
defendant. This equation of random match probability with source probability is known as the
prosecutor's fallacy." (Footnote omitted)). Mr. Abdullah's prosecutor and the State's DNA
expert both succumbed to the prosecutor's fallacy. The absence of a defense DNA expert

5

allowed this fallacy to

uncorrected, and allowed the prosecutor to repeat an incorrect version

of the original fallacy in closing argument, asserting Mr. Abdullah was the only man, of ten
possible DNA contributors in the Treasure Valley-with a population of 360,000-who had keys
to the house, who purchased gas, bought a cape, and was in Mountain Home after midnight.
(31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.101, L.13-p.102, L.17.)
The standards for funding a defense expert are clear, well-established, and more
thoroughly set forih in detail in the Appellant's Brief, and need not be repeated here.
(Appellant's Br. 9-11.) To the extent there is conflict between interpretation of the standards for
the appointment of a defense expert for an indigent defendant as expressed by this Court in State
v. Olin, l 03 ldaho 391, 394 ( 1982), and the United States Supreme Court three years later in Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-78 (1985), Ake controls. 3 In Ake, the Court identified three factors
a court must consider when deciding whether the State must provide an indigent defendant with
competent expert (psychiatric) assistance in preparing his defense:

( l) the private interest

affected, i.e., the accuracy of the criminal proceeding that puts a person's life or liberty at risk;
(2) the government's economic interest if the assistance is provided; and (3) the probable value
of the assistance. Id. at 77-78. The Supreme Court concluded the first factor automatically
weighs in a defendant's favor, while the third factor must include consideration of the risk of
error if the assistance is not provided; the Supreme Court held "where the potential accuracy of

3Ake

was issued three years after Olin. Both opinions address the standards for providing expert
assistance to an indigent defendant under federal Due Process and Equal Protection standards.
The United States Constitution sets the constitutional floor for minimal protections afforded to
citizens, not the ceiling. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). While states may rely on
their own constitutions to provide the same or greater protections to their citizens than is
afforded under the federal constitution, they cannot provide less protection. Id.; State v. Donato,
135 Idaho 469,471 (2000). Thus, Ake controls the analysis, not Olin.
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the jury's determination is so dramatically enhanced, and where the interests of the individual
and the State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the State's interest in its fisc must yield."
Id. at 78-79, 82-83 (footnote omitted).

Trial counsel supported their request for a defense DNA expert by attaching the State's
DNA expert report and explaining the expert's analysis would be used by the State to establish
Mr. Abdullah's presence at the scene the morning of Angie's death and the fire. (31659 Def's Ex
Parte Mot. to Supp. Application for Costs of Investigative and Expert Witnesses, pp.4-5.) Trial
counsel explained a defense DNA expert would be necessary to discredit and/or explain the
conclusions reached by State DNA experts who tested the gas can and cape, and to advise the
defense regarding the need for additional testing of the bag allegedly found over Angie's head.
(Id.) Of course, a substantial issue in Mr. Abdullah's case was whether he was at the scene the

morning of Angie's death and the fire, or if he was in Salt Lake City. Given that, the probable
value of the assistance of a defense DNA expert to challenge the State's DNA expert's
conclusions that Mr. Abdullah could not be excluded as a minor contributor to the DNA on the
cape and gas can at the scene, thus refuting his presence at the scene, was extraordinary.
The district court abused its discretion in refusing Mr. Abdullah's repeated requests to
fund a defense DNA expert. The court did not reach its decisions denying access to a DNA
expert by application of established legal standards, and did not reach its decisions through an
exercise of reason. The court simply found that because Mr. Abdullah did not contend the State's
testing was flawed, the results tainted, or the evidence mishandled by the State's chosen lab (not
the Idaho State Crime Lab), he did not establish a DNA expert was necessary to his defense.
Moreover, the court ordered Mr. Abdullah to direct his requests for DNA testing of any other
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evidence to the State; the court's order filtering Mr. Abdullah's testing requests through the State
would have compelled defense counsel to disclose work product and trial strategy to
Mr. Abdullah's pr<?secutors, in order to secure DNA testing and assistance. Conditioning a
defendant's right to obtain expert assistance on the disclosure of work product and trial strategy
to the very entity seeking not just to convict the defendant, but kill !um, is outrageous.
A defense DNA expert could have consulted with defense, helped the defense understand
the DNA evidence, identified shortcomings in the State expert's report and testing procedures,
recommended additional or different testing, helped the defense prepare for cross-examination of
the State's DNA expert, and testified on behalf of Mr. Abdullah. See

cl Ake,

470 U.S. at 81. As

the United States Supreme Court has recognized in finding the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation extends to analysts who conduct forensic testing:
Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.
According to a recent study conducted under the auspices of the National
Academy of Sciences, "[t]he majority of [laboratories producing forensic
evidence] are administered by law enforcement agencies, such as police
departments, where the laboratory administrator reports to the head of the
agency." National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward &--1 (Prepublication Copy
Feb. 2009) (hereinafter National Academy Report). And "[b ]ecause forensic
scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer a particular question
related to the issues of a particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice
appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency." Id., at S-17. A forensic
analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel
pressure-or have an incentive-to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the
prosecution.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009) (footnote omitted). 4

The constitutional right to cross-examine experts and forensic analysts about the results of their
testing is meaningless if counsel knows nothing of the scientific subject matter and has no idea
how to determine whether the analyst's results are fraudulent, incompetent or deficient.
4
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Clearly, the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Abdullah's request for
funds to retain a defense DNA expert by applying improper standards and improperly burdening
Mr. Abdullah with waiver of important protections in order to obtain testing to which he had
shown he was entitled. Mr. Abdullah was prejudiced by the absence of a defense DNA expert,
which allowed unreliable State expert's testimony regarding the value of the DNA evidence in
his case to go unchallenged through cross-examination, and similarly permitted the prosecutor to
engage in fallacious arguments about the likelihood of someone other than Mr. Abdullah being a
contributor to the mixed DNA samples. The State cannot show this error in depriving Mr.
Abdullah of a DNA expert was harmless.
III.

The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's First Degree
Murder Conviction
The evidence presented by the State was insufficient to support Mr. Abdullah's first
degree murder conviction. While the State attempts to frame its experts' trial testimony in a
different light on appeal, the experts' testimony before the jury was very clear: Angie ingested a
potentially lethal dose of Prozac between 10 p.m. and midnight on October 4, 2002, which
incapacitated her and contributed to her death. (31659 Tr. Vol .VI, p.457, L.19 - p.458, L.13,
p.480, Ls.13-22, p.551, L.16 - p.552, L.10, p.852, L.7 - p.853, L.6, p.864, L.18 - p.865, L.15,
p.866, L.4-7.) The State claims it was the absence of gelatinous material in Angie's stomach
contents from the volume of pills necessary to reach the potentially lethal level of Prozac Angie
had in her system at the time of her death, which led the State's experts to opine Angie ingested
Prozac between 10 p.m. and midnight. (Resp. Br. 27-28.) However, other State experts testified

9

Angie could have ingested the Prozac pills (between 40 and 100 bitter pills )5 dissolved in liquid,
and as a result, the State argues if Angie ingested the pills dissolved in liquid she could have
done so long after IO p.m. or midnight. (Id.) The State's argument on appeal mischaracterizes the
trial testimony of its own experts and lay witnesses.
It was a combination of testimony from Angie's family members about their activities the
night of October 4, Angie's stomach contents, the nominal amount of Prozac and Prozac
metabolite in Angie's system, and the absence of any gelatinous pill material in her stomach
contents, which collectively led to the conclusions of the State's experts that Angie ingested the
potentially lethal amount of Prozac before she consumed her last meal. (See 31659 Tr. Vol. IV,
p.51, L.23 ·· p.60, L.16 (A.H. testifying she, Angie, S.S., M.A. and N.A. got home from her Aunt
Charlene's about l0:30 p.m., and she and S.S. watched a movie with Angie, who was holding
M.A., and after it was over, Angie and M.A. went to bed); Vol. IV, p.97, L.24 - p. l 15, L.12 (S.S.
testifying she and A.H. went to bed about midnight but Angie was still up, and was in the kitchen
when S.S. last saw her); Vol. VL p.582, L. 1 - p.583, L.25 (Angie's Aunt Charlene testifying
Angie and the kids were at her home the night of October 4 th and left at about 9:00 or 9:30 p.m.;
Charlene did not observe anything unusual about Angie or her behavior); Vol. VI, p.551, L.19 p.553, L.9 (Dr. Backer, State's expert, testifying Prozac had to be ingested by Angie before her
last meal, based on the absence of Prozac or its metabolite in Angie's stomach contents);
Vol. VI, p.547, L.3 - p. 548, L.2 (Dr. Backer testifying Angie's ingestion of Prozac was acute,
based on the skewed ratio between the Prozac and its metabolite found in her system); Vol. VI,

5The

State's expert, Dr. Backer, testified a person would need to take at least 40 to 50 Prozac
tablets (40 milligram), and up to 100 tablets, to reach the concentration levels found in Angie's
system. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.548, L.16 - p.549, L.5, p.566, L.20 - p.567, L. 10.)
10

p.475, L. l - p.476, L.5, p.489,

12 (Dr. Graben agreeing the absence of metabolite in

Angie's blood indicated an acute increase in Prozac and then death, which prevented
metabolism, and cause of Angie's death was "the potentially lethal Fluoxetine in conjunction
with the asphyxiation by plastic bag."); Vol. VI, p.457, L.19 - p.460, L.2 (Dr. Graben testifying
Angie's stomach contents revealed a full stomach, with no pill particles or substances, and
stomach contents had to be from a meal consumed after 7:00 p.m. on October 4, 2002); Vol. VI,
p.825, L. 18 - p.836, L.17 (Dr. Barbieri, State's pharmacology expert, testifying Angie would
have shown toxic effects and signs--such as nausea and vomiting--if she ingested Prozac before
9:30 p.m. and because she did not, ingestion had to happen after that); Vol. VI, p.864, L.25 p.865, L. 15 (Dr. Barbieri testifying stomach emptying time is 1 ½ hours; because Angie's
stomach was full when she died, and the contents only partially digested, she would have
consumed her last meal 1 ½ hours before her death; given the small amount of Prozac in her
stomach, she had to have consumed the Prozac before the meal, not with it or after it).
In light of all the other evidence relating to Angie's behavior and demeanor that night,
which included an absence of vomiting and nausea and other outward exhibitions of toxicity
Angie would have manifested, the State experts reached the conclusion that Angie ingested the
Prozac in some form, liquid or otherwise, before her last meal, between 10 p.m. and midnight.

(Id. Vol. VI, p.866, Ls.4-7.)
Unlike in State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 713-15 (2009), where the indictment alleged
and the State presented evidence at trial the victim died as a result of a drug overdose, or
suffocation, or a combination of both, in Mr. Abdullah's case, the State presented evidence that a
potentially lethal dose of Prozac, which would have incapacitated Angie, was a condition
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precedent to her being suffocated with a bag over her head. Specifically, the State relied upon
Angie's incapacitated condition to explain why, after two autopsies, the State could find no
brnises or injuries consistent with defensive wounds, which Dr. Groben testified would be
present had Angie died from suffocation alone. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.462 Ls.3-22, p.465, L.6 p.466, L.9.) As a result, to prove Mr. Abclullah's gmlt of first degree murder, the State had to
prove his connection to Angie's ingestion of the Prozac, in addition to asphyxiation. (31659
Tr. VIII, p.177, Ls.11-13 (prosecutor concluding in closing argument: "She died because she was
debilitated and a plastic bag was put over her head and her oxygen supply was cut off.");
Vol. VI, p.870, L.3 - p.871, L.2 (Dr. Barbieri testifying to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty that Prozac was a contributory factor in Angie's death, and could have debilitated her,
caused her to have seizures, and caused her to go into a coma).)
In contrast, in Severson, the victim's cause of death was listed as undetermined because
the evidence supported either suffocation or overdose, and the victim could have died from
either one of these two possible causes, ·with one cause not being necessary to the other. 147
Idaho at 7 l3. The victim in Severson had a lethal level of Unisom in her system, a toxic level of
Ambien, but also had bruising and abrasions on her face and cuts inside her lips, indicative of
suffocation Id. This Court observed substantial trial evidence linked the defendant to the victim's
murder, including: motive; that he was preparing other people for the victim's death; he recently
tried to poison the victim; he tried to conceal the circumstances of the victim's death; and he had
the opportunity and means to kill her Id. Most notably, the State presented direct evidence
linking the defendant to the Ambien and Unisom, including proof the defendant requested and
picked up the victim's Ambien prescription the day before her death and had a baggie of Unisom
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pills hidden in the brim of a hat with "clad" printed on it. Id. at 715. Aside from being husband
and wife and sharing the same home, same bed, and same insurance, there was no evidence
presented linking Mr. Abdullah to Angie's Prozac.
On appeal, the State does not attempt to explain or cite to any evidence supporting a
connection between Mr. Abdullah and the Prozac, and no evidence presented at trial linked
Mr. Abdullah to the Prozac or Angie's ingestion of it. Because Angie's involuntary ingestion of
Prozac was integral to the State's case for first degree murder, the State had to present evidence
linking Mr. Abdullah to the Prozac. None of the State's evidence links Mr. Abdullah to the
Prozac, and none of the evidence puts Mr. Abdullah in Boise at or near the time Angie ingested
the Prozac. In fact, the State's own experts place Angie's ingestion of Prozac at a time
Mr. Abdullah was not even physically present in Boise, let alone in Angie's presence. Where
Angie's incapacitation from a potentially lethal amount of Prozac was necessa,y to prove
Mr. Abdullah suffocated Angie with a bag after she was incapacitated, thus explaining the
complete absence of any wounds or injuries that would have been present if Angie had been
awake or conscious at the time of suffocation, the absence of such evidence renders the evidence
insufiicient to support Mr. Abdullah's first degree murder conviction.
IV.
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's First Degree
Arson Conviction
The State's evidence of first degree arson, when viewed in the light most favorable to it
and the jury verdict, shows only that Mr. Abdullah attempted to willfully and unlawfully damage
a dwelling by fire or explosion. The State's experts testified the vapors from the gasoline in the
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garage were prematurely and accidentally ignited by a pilot light on the water heater, not
intentionally ignited by the person who poured the gas.
Mr. Abdullah maintains that even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, because he did not provide an ignition source for the gas vapors, he can only be held
responsible for acts he actually committed, which constitute the crime of attempted arson, not the
completed crime of arson.

The State seems to argue that pouring gas was more than mere

preparation for arson, and as a result, the pouring of the gas alone is arson. (Resp. Br. 34-37.)
That's like saying a defendant who intentionally stabs a victim in the chest is guilty of first
degree murder, even though the victim survives the stabbing, because the stabbing was more
than "mere preparation" for first degree murder.
Indeed, later in its briefing the State concedes that "but for the intervening spark caused
by the pilot light, nothing more was required than 'lighting the match' to complete Abdullah's
intended goal." (Resp. Br. 36.) The State's acknowledgement that arson requires more than
pouring gas leads to its next argument that because it was completely foreseeable and expected
for the water heater pilot light to ignite the gas fumes in the garage, the accidental ignition does
not "absolve

[Mr. Abdullah] of criminal liability under I.C. section 18-802." (Id.) That the

accidental ignition was foreseeable, expected or intended, is contradicted by the State's experts,
all of whom testified the ignition of the gas fumes in the garage by the water heater pilot light
was accidental and unexpected by whoever poured the gas. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.199, L.20 p.201, L.16, p.208, Ls.2-15, p.234, L.5 - p.235, L.2.) None of the evidence presented at trial
supports the State's claim on appeal that the accidental ignition was foreseeable and expected.
Moreover, no one has ever claimed the accidental ignition of the gas fumes would absolve
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Mr. Abdullah of all criminal liability. While the accidental ignition absolves Mr. Abdullah of
criminal liability for the completed act of first degree arson, it does not absolve him of liability
for the inchoate crime of attempted first degree arson. Up until the time the fumes or vapors were
ignited, there was time to withdraw and not complete the arson; we do not know what would
have happened if the pilot light had not prematurely ignited the gas fumes in the garage that
morning. Where the ignition happened by accident and without Mr. Abdullah's involvement or
knowledge or expectation, he can only be held responsible for his voluntary and intentional acts
which, based on the evidence presented at trial, qualify as attempted first degree arson, not arson.
VI.
The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Abdullah's Conviction Of
Felony Injury To A Child
This issue was thoroughly briefed and suppmt by relevant, controlling law, and amply
supported by extens1 ve citation to the record and transcript, including pinpoint citations to
relevant testimony by page and line numbers. 6 It bears repeating that the State presented no
evidence Mr. Abdullah committed an injury on N.A.; N.A. was found in the backyard of the
home by firefighters, where he could not have been longer than a few moments. N.A. was calm,
he was neither injured nor harmed, and was sitting on a comforter surrounded by toys and stuffed
animals. (31659 Tr. Vol. IV, p.365, L.22 - p.371, L.24.) There is no evidence Mr. Abdullah
intended to harm N.A., that he intended to place N.A. in harm's way, or that he knew he was
placing N .A. in a situation that would endanger N .A.' s person or health, given the presence of
firefighters and neighbors walking through the yard where N.A. was found.

6 The

State provides no citations to relevant lines of transcript testimony, but instead cites pages
and page ranges, leaving it to undersigned counsel and this Court to locate testimony the State
presumably is relying on to support its arguments.
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In addition, at the time of Mr. Abdullah' s offense and conviction, the willfulness element
of injury to a child was not satisfied by a person acting, or failing to act, "where a reasonable
person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result in injury or harm or is likely to
endanger the person, health, safety or well-being of the child." LC. § 18-150 l (I) (2005). This
definition of willful was not added to the statute until 2005, and thus could not be applied to
Mr. Abdullah's case. The only definition of willful provided to Mr. Abdullah's jury was the
definition under section 18-101, which this Comt previously acknowledged could not support a
conviction for felony injmy to a child. State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373 (2002). Applying the
correct statute and c01Tect definition of willful, there was insufficient evidence presented to
support Mr. Abdullah's conviction for felony injury to a child. The State's arguments merit no
additional response.
VII.
The District Comt Erred In Providing The Jury With A Single Definition Of Willful That Was
Wrong With Respect To All Charged Offenses Except Arson, Effectively Reducing The State's
Burden Of Proving Mr. Abdullah Guilty Of All Elements Of The Charged Offenses Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt

The instructions provided to Mr. Abdullah's jury reduced the State's burden of proving
every element of each charged offense by providing a single definition of willful that was wrong
for every charged offense, except arson. Such error violated Mr. Abdullah's due process rights
and was not harmless because it permitted the jury to convict him under incorrect legal theories,
with less than sufficient evidence, and had substantial and injurious effect or influence on the
jury's verdicts. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58 (2008); State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588
(2011 ). The willfulness of each charged offense was contested, and there was not overwhelming
evidence of willfulness for each offense. Draper, 151 Idaho at 588.
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Because trial counsel did not object to the willful instruction, the instruction must be
reviewed as fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 223 (2010). An error is
fundamental if a defendant shows: (1) the error violates one or more of his unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) it plainly exists on the appellate record; and (3) was not harmless. Id. at
228. An instruction that omits an element of the offense, or relieves the State of its burden of
proving every element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, violates due process.
Middleton v. AfcNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004); Draper, 151 Idaho at 588. Even without an
objection by counsel, if a jury reaches its verdict based on erroneous jury instructions which
vitiate all of the jury's findings, the appellate court will not engage in harmless error analysis,
and instead will vacate and remand the case for a new trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
1 (1993 ); Perry, l 50 Idaho at
Mr. Abdullah's jury was told that willful meant something less than intentional, and
required no intent to harm or cause injury. (31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.189, L.8 - p.191, L.15;
31659 Supp. R., pp.69-70.) Specifically, Mr. Abdullah's jurors were told "an act is willful or
done willfully when done on purpose. One can act willfully without intending to violate the law
to injure another or to acquire any advantage." (31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.191, Ls.9-13 (emphasis
added).) Armed with this definition of willful, Mr. Abdullah's jury retired to determine whether
he was guilty of all six charged offenses, each of which except arson required a specific intent to
injure another person. 7 It must be presumed the jury followed the instructions, considered them

7Notably,

had Mr. Abdullah been properly charged with attempted arson, this definition of
willful would have been wrong for attempted arson as well. See, e.g., State v. Luke, 134 Idaho
294, 300 (2000) ("However, as pointed out in Pratt the crime of attempt does require a specific
showing of intent to commit the underlying crime.").
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as a whole, and gave no consideration to the order in which the instructions were provided.
(R. 31659, J.I.4.)
The State claims the presumption that jurors followed the instructions does not apply here
where the jury asked for the definition of willful with respect to the elements instruction for
arson, and as a result, would have only applied the willful definition to arson. (Resp. Br. 44.)
Arguably, the State's position would have some merit if the district court had told jurors the
definition of willful applied only to arson. But instead, without caveat or qualification, the
district court responded to the jury question by telling them "an act is willful or done willfully
when done on purpose. One can act willfully without intending to violate the law to injure
another or to acquire any advantage." (31659 Tr. Vol. VlII, p.191, Ls.9-13; 31659 Supp. R.,
p.70.) Nothing about the court's definition of willful limits its application to arson. Such a
limitation was particularly important in this case where willful was an element of every crime
charged in the indictment, but arson was the only charged offense for which this reduced mens

rea of willful applied. The definition of willful provided to the jury was wrong for every offense
except arson, it relieved the State of its burden to prove intent for every charged offense, and
violated Mr. Abdullah's due process rights.
The first degree murder and attempted first degree murder instructions in Mr. Abdullah's
case, coupled with the erroneous definition of willful, are akin to the erroneous instruction in

State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho 164 (1998). In Buckley, the defendant shot the victim and was
charged with attempted first degree murder. 131 Idaho at 164-65. At trial, the defendant was
found guilty of attempted second degree murder. Id. On appeal, he argued the trial court's failure
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to include "intent to kill" m the elements instruction for attempted second degree murder was
error requiring his conviction be vacated. Id. This Court agreed. Id. at l 67.
In Buckley, the defendant's jury was instructed that to find the defendant guilty of
attempted second degree murder, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant engaged in conduct that would have caused the death of the victim, that he acted
without justification or excuse, and with malice aforethought. Id. at 165. This Court deemed the
elements instmction incoITect because it did not require the jury to find the defendant intended to
kill the victim. Id. The State argued that the erroneous clements instruction was cured by two
other instructions, one that defi ncd malice as express or implied according to section 18-4002 of
Idaho Code, and another that stated "[t]he crime of MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE
requires the specific intent to kill a human being with malice aforethought." Id. at 165. This
Court disagreed, concluding:
In the present case, Instruction No. 18 [the elements instruction] purported to tell
the jury all the elements of the crime of attempted second degree murder they
would have to find to convict Buckley of that offense. By leaving out the element
of the intent to kill, it did not include all the elements of the crime.
Id. at 166. This Court vacated the defendant's conviction, finding it "impossible to determine

whether [the defendant] was convicted under the legally valid theory of express malice (intent to
kill) or the legally invalid theory of implied malice." Id. at 167.
Here, like the jury in Buckley, Mr. Abdullah's jury was provided with the definition of
malice for first degree murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder that included
express malice, which would encompass an intent to kill, and implied malice, which would not.
Buckley, 131 Idaho at 165; R. 31659 J .I. 15. Mr. Abdullah' s jury was also instructed that to find

him guilty of first degree murder, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in
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conduct that caused Angie's death, he acted without justification or excuse, he acted with malice
aforethought, and the murder was a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. (R. 31659, J.I.
13, J.I. 16.) Similarly, Mr. Abdullah's jury was instructed that to find him guilty of three counts
of attempted first degree murder, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt he "did some act
which was a step toward committing the crime of Murder in the first degree of (A.H., M.A. and
S.S,] and when doing so [Mr. Abdullah] intended to commit that particular crime." (R. 31659,
J.I. 21, J.I. 23, J.I. 25.) Mr. Abdullah's jury was then instructed that the crime of murder in the
first degree of A.H., M.A. and S.S. would be committed if a person engaged in conduct which
caused the death of A.H., M.A. and

acted without justification or excuse, acted with malice

aforethought, and the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated. (R. 31659, J.I 22, J .I. 24,
J.I. 26.)
Like the jury in Buckley, Mr. Abdullah's jury was provided with a definition for malice
aforethought that allowed his jury to find him guilty of first degree murder and three counts of
attempted first degree murder, even if he lacked the intent to kill. As explained above, when
Mr. Abdullah's jury asked for a definition of willful, it was provided with a definition that did
not require an intent to hann or injure, let alone an intent to kill. Like the jury in Buckley, it
cannot be said that Mr. Abdullah's jury did not rely upon the legally invalid theory of implied
malice to find him guilty of first degree murder and three counts of attempted first degree
murder. Under these circumstances, where Mr. Abdullah's jury was provided with an implied
malice instruction and an erroneous definition of willful, neither of which required the jury to
find Mr. Abdullah had the specific intent to kill Angie, A.H., M.A. or S.S., none of these
convictions can stand.
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Thus, where the definition of willful vitiates all of the jury's findings of the willful
element for every offense except arson, harmless error analysis is improper and Mr. Abdullah's
convictions must be vacated.
VIII.
The District Court Erred In Admitting Angie's Statements To Her Lawyer And Medical
Providers Over Mr. Abdullah's Objection, Where Such Statements Were Irrelevant And
Constituted Improper Character Evidence That Was More Prejudicial Than Probative
Angie's statements to her lawyer and medical providers regarding sterilization,
Mr. Abdullah's willingness to get a vasectomy, her perspective on the condition of her man-iage
and divorce, Mr. Abdullah's past infidelity, her suspicions that he had been unfaithful in the
spring of 2002, and her statements to her lawyer regarding Mr. Abdullah's character, were
irrelevant. As a result, the district court committed error when it admitted these statements. (See
Appellant's Br. 39-46.) Because the statements were not relevant to any issue, whether the court
also abused its discretion in deeming the statements more probative than prejudicial, is a
question that need not be reached. The court did not identify how Angie's statements made any
fact of consequence to the charges against Mr. Abdullah more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence, instead holding the statements were either statements for the purposes of
medical treatment, statements that reflected Angie's state of mind, or, with respect to Angie's
confidential statements to her lawyer about divorce, were probative of Mr. Abdullah's "potential
motive." (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.316, L.12

p.317, L.2, p.318, Ls.1-6, p.319, Ls.16-23, p.362,

L.25 - p.363, L.5, p.612, Ls.3-10, p.707, L.22 - p.708, L.11, p.709, Ls.4-22; Vol. VII, p.51, L.15
p.52, L.15.) None of these statements, except those regarding sterilization and Mr. Abdullah's
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willingness to get a vasectomy, 8 were admitted for their truth; instead, these statements were
admitted by the district court as statements for the purpose of medical treatment to show Angie's
"state of mind." (Id. Tr. Vol. VI, p.358, L.7 -p.368, L.7, p.362, L.25

p.363, L.5, p.709, Ls. l

22.) Notably, the State does not respond to Mr. Abdullah's claims of error with regard to Angie's
statements to her medical providers, which Mr. Abdullah maintains were iITelevant, but only
responds to the statements Angie made to her attorney, Deb Kristal. (Resp. Br. 46-51.)
This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of evidence using a
mixed standard ofreview. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217,221
(2008). First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to
free review. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569, 165 P.3d 273, 283 (2007).
Second, we review the district court's determination of whether the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221. We determine whether the district
court abused its discretion by examining: (1) whether the court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Id. However, an abuse of discretion may be deemed hannless if a substantial right
is not affected. State v. Thornpson, 132 Idaho 628,636, 977 P.2d 890, 898 (1999).
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363 (2010).
Statements for the purpose of medical treatment are admissible as hearsay exceptions
only if they are relevant, i.e., have some connection to a fact of consequences in the case. LR.E.
401. As reflected by the district court's decisions admitting Angie's statements to her doctor, her

8Dr.

Williams testified regarding the contents of her conversation with Angie about sterilization,
including: what Dr. Williams told all her patients about the benefits of vasectomies over female
sterilization (including less invasive procedures and lower costs); that the decision to be
sterilized was Angie's, not the Abdullahs' as a couple; and, Angie's assertion that Mr. Abdullah
would not have a vasectomy. (31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.320, L.11 p.322, L.10.) Dr. Williams also
testified Mr. Abdullah was not present after Angie's sterilization surgery. (Id., p.321, L.14
p.322, L. l 0.) All of these statements were admitted for their truth, as statements for the purpose
of medical treatment.
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nurse practitioner, and her therapist about Mr. Abdullah's past infidelity, sterilization,
vasectomies, and divorce, the statements were admitted as statements for the purpose of medical
treatment. The district court also deemed Angie's statements to her nurse practitioner and
therapist to be relevant to Angie's state of mind, but inadmissible for their truth.
Not only were the statements to Angie's medical/mental health providers and those to her
lawyer, Ms. Kristal, irrelevant, but even assuming for the sake of argument the statements were
relevant and admissible to show Angie's state of mind, the statements were nevertheless
inadmissible because they failed to reflect Angie had a state of mind inconsistent with a design
or mtent to take her own life. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364. A person contemplating divorce is
not exhibiting a state of mind inconsistent with suicide, but is actually exhibiting a state of mind
that is consistent with suicide and hopelessness. Angie's statements expressing concerns about
the couples' finances, Mr. Abdullah's commitment to his faith and reputation in the Muslim
community, the sale of her house, moving to Saudi Arabia or Africa, his character, his past
infidelity, her belief he had no driver's license, her prior experience when she left him, the
impact of a Muslim will for A.H, her daughter, and expressing an interest in creating a formal
will to cover N.A. and M.A., arc all statements that were not made to Mr. Abdullah, and are
statements that do not show a state of mind inconsistent with suicide. Instead, they seem to show
the opposite; they reflect a woman who is exhausted, with few options, and who does not know
what to do. Moreover, Angie's statements about divorce and infidelity, as well as all of her
statements to Ms. Kristal, can have no bearing on Mr. Abdullah's motive where the statements
and state of mind were not shared with Mr. Abdullah. They were all made in the context of
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protected, privileged doctor/therapist-patient and lawyer-client relationships, outside the
presence of Mr. Abdullah and third parties.
Assuming the district court did not err in concluding these statements were relevant and
admissible, the court nevertheless abused its discretion in deciding the probative value of these
statements, except those offered through Velma Seabolt and Gina Wolfe Seybold, was not
substantially outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or
misleading the jury . . . . " LR.E. 403; Tr. Vol. VI, p.319, Ls.16-24, p.612, Ls.11-25, p.709,
Ls.4-12. Notably, the district court did not evaluate Angie's statements to Ms. Seabolt and
Ms. Wolfe of Mr. Abdullah's past infidelity (in 2000), the condition of her marriage or concerns
about their relationship and providing for her children, under Idaho Rules of Evidence 403.
(31659 Tr. Vol. VI, p.362, L.25

p.363, L.5; Vol. VH, p.51, L. 15 -- p.52, L.16.) This Court has

deemed a district court's failure to conduct a 403 analysis when excluding evidence to be error
requiring a vacation of a judgment of conviction and sentence, absent proof from the State that
the error is harmless. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469,471 (2010).
Admission of Angie's privileged and confidential statements to medical/mental health
providers and her lawyer served no purpose except to assassinate Mr. Abdullah's character,
inflame the jury against him and lead jurors to convict him for being a bad husband, not because
the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the charged offenses. Because
Mr. Abdullah has demonstrated the court erred in admitting these statements over counsels'
objections, the State must prove the admission of the statements was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, i.e., the statements did not contribute to the verdict. State v. Almaraz, 154
Idaho 584, 600-01 (2013). The State cannot and has not met its burden. (Resp. Br. 51.)
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IX.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Statements Made By Mr. Abdullah
Regarding Practices fn His Country Of Origin That Were Irrelevant And Unfairly Prejudicial
Mr. Abdullah's responses to his co-worker's queries about the differences between the
United States and Northern Iraq, particularly with respect to marriage, marriage ceremonies and
adultery, were wholly irrelevant to any fact of cpnsequence and were substantially more
prejudicial than probative. The district court abused its discretion in admitting these statements;
even though the court recognized the matter was one of discretion, it relied on inaccurate facts
and unreasonable inferences to reach its decision, resulting in a decision outside the bounds of its
discretion. The district court admitted the statements as reflective of Mr. Abdullah's state of
mind, based primarily on the prosecutor's proffer. The prosecutor told the court Mr. Adams, a
co-worker of Mr. Abdullah, would testify that "when asked about can you tell us some of the
differences between where you are from, the only thing that he mentions is that it 1s permissible
under circumstances that are shocking to us to kill your wife, and that all you have to do when
you are the judge of those circumstances is to offer some farthing [sic] to the parents. And that is
highly relevant. He chose those words. He chose the setting." (31659 Tr. Vol. VII, p.105, L.18 p.106, L.9.)
In admitting the testimony of Mr. Adams and similar testimony from another co-worker,
Mr. Reagles, the court stated, "it's a close question. And I have to admit, Counsel, I think you're
right. These are words that he chose, this is what he chose to be
where he's from and

the thing that distinguishes

especially, if the words are accurately reflected that "we"

associating himself with this country, it's an

so he's still

it is something that is odd for him to pick out in

the months leading up to the fire and death of Ms. Abdullah." (Id. Tr. Vol. VII, p.106, Ls.12-19.)

25

Mr. Adams testified he, Mr. Abdullah, Mr. Reagles, and some other co-workers were in a
car on their way to lunch and were discussing cultural differences between Northern Iraq and
America. (id., p.310, L.21

p.311, L.24.) Mr. Reagles testified Mr. Adams asked Mr. Abdullah

about differences between the United States and Northern Iraq. (Id. p. l 08, Ls.1-24.) Someone in
the car brought up the issue of adultery, and Mr. Abdullah indicated that in Northern Iraq, "it was
an acceptable practice to murder or have your wife murdered if she did commit adultery." (Id.
p.311, Ls.24-p.312, L.5.)
Contrary to the district court's conclusion and the State's argument (Resp. Br. 53; 31659
Tr. Vol. VII, p. l 06, Ls.12-19), this was not the only difference between Northern Iraq and
American identified by Mr. Abdullah. Rather, general differences between the cultures were
being discussed when someone else raised the issue of adultery and Mr. Abdullah explained how
adultery was treated in Notihern Iraq. According to testimony from the State's own witnesses,
contrary to the State's current protestations, Mr. Abdullah neither expressly nor impliedly
adopted the Northern Iraqi policy on adultery, or indicated he thought it was a good idea. (31659
Tr. Vol. VII, p.109, L.12 - p.110, Ll, p.312, L.11 - p.313, L.4; Resp. Br. 53-54.) Moreover,
even if it was the cultural practice of husbands in Northern Iraq to kill their adulterous wives, in
order to be relevant to this case, the State would have to present some evidence Mr. Abdullah
both ascribed to this practice and had a reason to engage in it, i.e., Angie was unfaithful. No
evidence on either point was presented. The statements were simply irrelevant, and whatever
scintilla of probative value they may have had was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice
and misleading the jury. These statements are nothing more than a red herring, meant to direct
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the jury to harbor unfair prejudice against Mr. Abdullah because of the corner of the world where
he was born, not because these statements have anything to do with the facts of this case.
After claiming these statements were somehow an implied or tacit admission by
Mr. Abdullah that he subscribed to the practices of Northern Iraqis with respect to adulterous
wives, the State argues the statements were properly admitted because they were "highly relevant
in establishing intent and premeditation." (Resp. Br. 53-54.) If I was born and raised in Saudi
Arabia until l was ten years old, and was talking to my coworkers about the differences between
the treatment of women in the United States and Saudi Arabia, and someone brought up driving,
and I said "where I am from, women cannot legally drive a car," how could my statement of fact
be deemed my adoption of Saudi Arabia's policy and practice of prohibiting women from
driving, or be deemed to be my thoughts and beliefs? lt could not. Similarly, these statements
were not relevant to Mr. Abdullah's state of mind because they were not statements of his
thoughts or beliefs.
After arguing Mr. Abdullah's statements were highly relevant to establish his intent and
premeditation, the State minimizes their impact, arguing the statements were not relevant.
Specifically, in arguing Mr. Abdullah was not harmed by admission of these statements, the
State submits they were "not determinative of any issue or element." (Resp. Br. 54.) To the
extent the State concedes the statements were not relevant, it is correct. Not only were the
statements not detenninative of any issue or element, they had absolutely no tendency to make
the existence of any fact of consequence more probable or less probable than it would have been
without the statements. The district court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. Abdullah's
statements through two separate witnesses; it cannot be said, and the State has not proven, that
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the guilty verdicts in this case were not attributable to these statements. Accordingly,
Mr. Abdullah's convictions must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial untainted by
irrelevant, prejudicial evidence.

X.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Allow The Jury To Hear Evidence Of
Angie's Life [nsurance Policy Where Mr. Abdullah Was Not A Beneficiary
This issue was thoroughly briefed and supported by relevant authority and citations to the
record in the Appellant's Brief. 9 Given the State's Response, however, it must be clarified
Mr. Abdullah is only challenging the district court's exclusion of evidence of Angie's $500,000
life insurance policy, to which he was not a beneficiary, and proof that Angie took loans out
against this policy prior to their marriage.
The State submitted substantial evidence Mr. Abdullah purchased insurance on the
vending machines months before the fire, and that he would benefit from the homeowner's
policy on the Abdullah residence. Mr. Abdullah was prevented from presenting evidence of the
half-a-million dollar life insurance policy Angie had on herself and her daughter, the most

9 The

State argues Mr. Abdullah failed to support this claim by argument and citation authority.
Mr. Abdullah incorporated the standards from Claim VIII by reference, which include
admissibility of evidence, the standard of review, and standards applicable to determining
whether a district court abused its discretion. (Appellant's Br. pp.39-40, 50.) While Mr. Abdullah
did not cite to any cases addressing the admissibility of life insurance policies in a criminal case
by a defendant to disprove the state's allegation of financial motive for murder, that is because
the only cases Mr. Abdullah could locate regarding life insurance policies involve disputes
among potential beneficiaries or passing references to prosecutors relying on insurance policies
as proof of motive to kill. See, e.g., Dugmore v. Lattimore, 413 Fed. Appx. 989, 991 (9 th Cir.
2011) (referencing prosecutor's reliance on victim's recently increased life insurance policy as
proof of defendant's motive to kill him where she was the beneficiary); Banner Life Ins. Co. v.
lvlark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 117 (2009) (remanding for determination of
whether surviving spouse or deceased husband's trust should receive life insurance policy
proceeds).
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valuable of all of the insurance policies, to which he was not a beneficiary. This policy was
relevant to undermine the State's claim that Mr. Abdullah had a financial motive to kill Angie;
moreover, evidence regarding the claim would have revealed Angie took out loans against this
policy long before she married Mr. Abdullah, further contradicting the State's claim that Mr.
Abdullah had a financial incentive to kill Angie. (Resp. Br. 57.)

Mr. Abdullah does not

challenge the district court's exclusion of Angie's statements on the insurance application itself,
but continues to object to the district court's refusal to allow him to admit evidence of the
existence of the life insurance policy, and loans Angie took out against the policy before they
were married. If Mr. Abdullah's beneficiary status on two insurance policies and the fact that
Angie took out loans against her life insurance policy during her marriage were relevant to
motive in the State's case-in-chief, it is unclear how information showing Angie took loans out
against the same policy before she was married to Mr. Abdullah, and he was not a beneficiary of
the most valuable insurance policy, can be irrelevant. The information has the "tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,671 (2010) (citing I.R.E. 401).
Because this information was relevant to rebut the State's evidence and argument that
Mr. Abdullah had a financial motive to kill Angie and destroy the family's home, the mere
existence of the insurance policy, its value and the dates loans were taken out against the policy,
were not outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury and wasting the jury's time. See I.R.E.
401, 402, 403. The district court erred in deeming the half-million-dollar life insurance was
irrelevant to Mr. Abdullah's defense, and therefore inadmissible. (31659 Tr. Vol. VII, p.538,
L.7 - p.539, L.21.)
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XIV.
The District Court's Finding That There Are No Grounds To Challenge The Legality Of The
Tenn Of The Grand Jury That Indicted Mr. Abdullah Is Clearly Erroneous And Not Supported
By The Record
This claim was thoroughly briefed, argued and supported by citation to the record and
controlling authority in the Appellant's Brief (See Appellant's Br. 59-61.) The State argues
Mr. Abdullah did not "raise any error associated with the court's findings" that there is no legal
basis to challenge the term of the grand jury that indicted him. (Resp. Br. 71-72.) To the contrary,
Mr. Abdullah maintains the district court's conclusion that no grounds exist to challenge the
legality of the term of the grand jury that indicted him is clearly erroneous and not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. (Appellant's Br. 59.)
The record reflects a grand jury was impaneled the morning of August

2002, and

orders were issued to summon potential grand jurors to appear that same day at 1:30 p.m. (Id.
pp.60-61.) The record also reflects Mr. Abdullah was indicted by a grand jury on November 14,
2002; there is nothing in the record showing a connection between the indicting jurors and the
jurors impaneled the morning of August 28, 2002. (Id.) The State claims because Mr. Abdullah
did not challenge the formation or jurisdiction of the grand jury, the attack on the district court's
findings is insufficient to raise a legal challenge. (Resp. Br. 73-74.) Mr. Abdullah asserts, as he
always has, that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that he was indicted by a legally
formed grand jury, acting within its terms. (Appellant's Br. 59-61.)
Accordingly, Mr. Abdullah is entitled to a new trial because the district court's
conclusion that he was indicted by a legally formed and termed grand jury is erroneous.
Alternative! y, the district court's findings must be vacated and this Court must either: ( 1) order
the grand jury selection transcripts be provided under seal for counsels' review and permit
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supplemental briefing if necessary; or (2) order the district court to provide counsel documents
showing the grand jury that indicted Mr. Abdullah on November 14, 2002, is the same grand jury
impaneled at 9:00 a.m. on August 28, 2002.

POST-CONVICTION ISSUES to
I.

The District Court Erred In Applying An Incorrect Standard To The Prejudice Portion Of
Mr. Abdullah's Claims Ofineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Denying Mr. Abdullah
Post-Conviction Relief
The State concedes the district court incorrectly stated the standard for assessing the
prejudice prong of the two-part ineffective assistance of counsel standard established in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ( I 984). (Resp. Br. 120-21.) Under Strickland, a petitioner
need only show there is a reasonable probability that but for his counsels' unprofessional errors,
the results of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694. The reasonable
probability standard is a lower burden than a preponderance of the evidence, requiring a showing
only that counsels' errors have rendered the result of the proceeding unreliable, not that counsels'
errors more likely than not altered the outcome. Id at 693-94. Nevertheless, the State maintains
the district court evaluated Mr. Abdullah's claims applying the proper standard and argues
Mr. Abdullah simply found two "snippets" where the court erroneously stated the burden for
showing prejudice. (Resp. Br. 121.) What the State fails to recognize is that these "snippets"
citing the erroneous standard for showing prejudice are contained in the section where the district
court sets forth the standards it applied to all of Mr. Abdullah's Final Petition claims alleging

Mr. Abdullah relies upon his Appellant's Brief and will not reply to the State's Response to
each of his post-conviction claims, unless an additional response is warranted.
10
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"actual ineffective assistance of counsel" under Strickland. (R.39417, pp.8353-55.) In addition, a
review of the district court's findings and conclusions for each ineffective assistance of counsel
claim reveals the district court actually applied the wrong standard, distinguishing this case from
Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 654-55 (2004) (holding despite the lower court's erroneous

statement that the petitioner had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsels'
errors altered the outcome, the court actually applied the correct reasonable probability standard).
In Holland, the lower court stated it was applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to the
prejudice prong of the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance, when in fact, it had applied the
less demanding reasonable probability standard. 542 U.S. at 654-55. Here, in contrast, the district
court not only identified the wrong standard, but applied the wrong standard to Mr. Abdullah'
claims. (Appellant's Br. 92-191.) Specifically, the district court required Mr. Abdullah to prove
his counsels' deficient performance "more likely than not" altered the outcome of his case. (Id.)
Accordingly, it is clear the district court did not know and did not apply the correct standard to its
evaluation of Mr. Abdullah's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The State also argues the district court did not reject the ABA Guidelines for determining
the reasonableness of counsels' representation, but simply recognized the Guidelines were one
factor, among many, to be weighed by the court. (Resp. Br. 122.) To the contrary, the district
court took issue with Mr. Abdullah relying upon the ABA Guidelines for the prevailing
professional practice at the time of his trial. (R. 39417, p.8434.) While the State and the district
court may oppose rigid application of the ABA Guidelines to determine the reasonableness of
counsels' performance, that is not how Mr. Abdullah asked the court to apply the ABA
Guidelines. Simply put, Mr. Abdullah asked the district court to consider the ABA Guidelines
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in the same way both the United States Supreme Court and this Court1 1 have: as the prevailing
professional norms of practice which serve as a starting point for evaluating the reasonableness
of counsels' performance. (Appellant's Br. 163-65.) In sum, Mr. Abdullah asked the district
comt to rely upon the ABA Guidelines to guide its assessment of whether counsels' performance
was reasonable according to prevailing professional norms of practice.
The district court rejected Mr. Abdullah's request, and rejected the ABA Guidelines as
establishing the prevailing professional norms of practice at the time of his trial. ft is unclear
what standards, if any, the district court relied on for determining the prevailing professional
norms of practice, and equally unclear which standards the district comi applied to assess the
reasonableness of counsels' performance.
Because the district court rejected well-established standards set forth in the ABA
Guidelines in favor of unstated, unknown standards to determine whether counsels' performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and applied an erroneous standard to judge
whether Mr. Abdullah was prejudiced by his counsels' deficiencies, the district court's order
dismissing Mr. Abdullah's ineffective assistance of claims should be vacated and his case
remanded for reconsideration of his claims applying appropriate, identified standards.

11 As

it does in every case involving the ABA Guidelines, the State argues this Court refused to
adopt the ABA guidelines in State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 782 (1997). The argument is
phrased in a way that leads the reader to conclude this Court rejected the ABA Guidelines in
their entirety. In fact, this Court rejected the defendant's request that this Court require two
attorneys be appointed to represent a defendant in capital cases, as was required by the ABA
Guidelines, but not Idaho law. Id. This Court did not reject the ABA Guidelines wholesale.
Moreover, just a few years after Porter, this Court adopted the two attorney requirement in
capital cases. See Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3(2)(a)(l).
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VII.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Abdullah's Claim That He Was
Denied His Sixth Amendment Right To Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Counsels' Failure
To Investigate, Prepare And Present An Adequate Case In Mitigation
Mr. Abdullah maintains his trial counsels' mitigation investigation was nominal, and the
quality and depth of available mitigation evidence presented to his jury was wholly inadequate.
Counsels' failures with respect to the investigation, preparation and presentation of a mitigation
case on Mr. Abdullah's behalf were unreasonable, falling well below any standard of
professional norms, regardless of which standards are applied. There is a reasonable probability
that but for counsels' errors and omissions at sentencing, Mr. Abdullah would have been able to
convince at least one juror that a death sentence would be unjust. Trial counsels' failures at
sentencing render the death verdict wholly unreliable and undermine any confidence in the
outcome.
The State argues that it has only been through "years of additional investigation and
exhaustive state resources" that the SAPD has been able to "unearth" additional mitigation about
Mr. Abdullah. (Resp. Br. 132.) As the State is well aware, the SAPD budget is set by the State
legislature, and during the time the SAPD has represented Mr. Abdullah, the recession forced
significant personnel and operating cuts to the SAPD budget, including unpaid staff furloughs.
(R. 39417, pp.6451-63.) It is absurd for the State to argue the mitigation in Mr. Abdullah's was
only discovered because the SAPD was able to expend unlimited state resources to investigate
his background, when in fact, the mitigation presented to the district court in post-conviction was
always at trial counsels' fingertips, had they bothered to look or ask.
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this Court has recognized:
Presentation of some mitigating evidence, even if strong, is insufficient if
other mitigating evidence is available upon reasonable investigation. Rompilla v.
Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387--93, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-69, 162 L.Ed.2d 360, 375-79
(2005). However, no relief is mandated where counsel's investigation is not as
thorough as it could have been because the courts "address not what is prudent or
appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled." Burger v. Kemp, 483
U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3126, 97 L.Ed.2d 638, 657 (1987).

State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 388 (2013). Mr. Abdullah does not claim that trial counsels'
investigation and presentation were "not as thorough as [they] could have been," but maintains
their investigation and presentation of evidence in mitigation barely scratched the surface.
In defense of the mitigation case, the State cites Kim's penalty phase opening statement
to show counsel had a mitigation theme, 12 even if they did not present it. (Resp. Br. 138.) The
State then argues counsels' presentation of an hour and a half of testimony from Mr. Abdullah's
family members, most of which required the assistance of an interpreter, was sufficient, and any
more would have been cumulative. (Resp. Br. 137-42.) The State seems to expend more time and
energy summarizing the four family members' testimony than counsel took to elicit it. In sum,
the State's position appears to be that in the context of mitigation and mitigating evidence, less is
more.
That would be like saying "Seymour Glass committed suicide" is the same as saying
[Seymour Glass] got off at the fifth floor, walked down the hall, and let
himself into 507. The room smelled of new calfskin luggage and nail-lacquer
remover.
He glanced at the girl lying asleep on one of the twin beds. Then he went
over to one of the pieces of luggage, opened it, and from under a pile of shorts
and undershirts he took out an Ortgies caliber 7.65 automatic. He released the
12Of

course, statements of counsel are not evidence and cannot be relied upon as such. State v.
Fondren, 24 Idaho 663 n.4 (1913).
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magazine, looked at it, then reinserted it. He cocked the piece. Then he went over
and sat down on the unoccupied bed, looked at the girl, aimed the pistol, and fired
a bullet through his right temple.
J.D. SALINGER, A Pe1fect Day for Bananafish in NINE STORIES 18 (Bantam Books, October

1964) (1953). Applying the State's logic, the latter description is simply cumulative of the
former four word statement, and far less compelling.
The logic of this argument leads the State to equate Dr. Gunter's descriptions of the
conditions at the refugee camps where Mr. Abdullah and his family languished for years as
"marginal" or "submarginal," with Haji's vivid description of just one of the camps:
The living conditions in Silopi were horrible. There were open pits of
human waste and the stench was horrible. They were withholding food, tea, and
sugar from us. When we protested the food and living conditions, Turkish soldiers
killed one of our neighbors and mjured several others. Azad witnessed these acts
of violence, and he was very frightened.
(R. 39417, p.4966.) Rahan's description of Camp Mardin, the refugee camp where the Abdullah
family lived for over four years before coming to America, would similarly be cumulative of
testimony that the conditions in the camps were "marginal" or "submarginal."
We lived in our tent in Mardin for over four years, while Azad was
approximately eleven to fifteen years old. We had inadequate water and food,
especially at the beginning. Water was always a problem. Sometimes the guards
would shut off the water, and we had to carry it from neighboring villages ....
Toilets at Mardin were open pits and trenches. Our tent was very close to the open
pit. Flies, death, and disease were everywhere, especially in the afternoons and
evenings. Sometimes the human waste came into our tent, and children were
urinating on the side of our tent. Sometime people fell into the open pit toilets and
died or became very ill. I believe over four hundred people died at the camp.
(R. 39417, p.4758.) Clearly, Dr. Gunter's descriptions of the conditions at the camps as
"marginal" or "submarginal" are accurate, albeit understated; nevertheless, the words marginal
and submarginal do nothing to convey the actual conditions Mr. Abdullah and his family were
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subjected to, each and every day, for numerous years during his adolescent development. The
State's argument that brief, pithy descriptions are the functional equivalent of vivid, compelling,
and detailed testimony providing jurors with first-hand accounts of the extraordinarily difficult
circumstances and situations Mr. Abdullah and his family faced before coming to America, and
the difficulties they overcame to assimilate into American culture, is simply absurd.
In response to the undisputed evidence of counsels' inadequate preparation for penalty

phase testimony and witnesses, the State argues counsel failed to prepare mitigation witnesses to
testify "because of their desire to have spontaneity, which can arguably result in greater emotion
before the jury since the witnesses were not aware of the exact subject matter of their testimony."
(Resp. Br. 142.) Aside from being outrageous, this speculation, if adopted, would excuse
counsels' failure to prepare for every aspect of trial, guilt and penalty phase alike, because
preparation might lead to knowledge of what a witness 1s going to say or what evidence is going
to be offered. In fact, it would not only excuse such a tactic, but would encourage it. According
to the State, such knowledge and preparation would put counsel at a disadvantage by removing
the emotion and spontaneity from trials, which the State apparently believes should be slapped
together at the last minute and unfold organically in the courtroom.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly condemned the approach advocated by
the State. As the Court has long acknowledged, strategic decisions made without the benefit of
adequate investigation are unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (holding
Court's focus is on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision was itself was
reasonable). "The relevant question is not whether counsels' choices were strategic, but whether
they were reasonable." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000) (citation omitted).
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Counsels' mitigation investigation was inadequate, and their preparation for the mitigation case
was virtually non-existent; no strategy could justify the mitigation case presented by trial counsel
in this case, and counsels' choices cannot be deemed reasonable under these circumstances.
The State also argues because Kim was admonished by the court to keep her emotions
under control during her examination of witnesses, that shows counsel presented a compelling
story of Mr. Abdullah's tragic childhood to the jury, and presumably this presentation had an
emotional impact on Kim, which she could not hide from jurors, the State or the district court.
(Resp. Br. 141-42; 31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.341, Ls.7-10.) After Kim finished eliciting a few
minutes of largely unemotional testimony from Abdullah family friend, Jim Rogers, and once the
Jury was excused, the prosecutor stated: "I have concerns about counsel's composure when she's
asking questions, Judge. I think it is an unfair communication to the jury. I would like to have
that addressed." (31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, p.341, Ls.3-6.) The distnct court responded, "Counsel, I
share this concern. I understand this is an emotional experience and this has kind of been an

ongoing issue before. So l just really want to admonish you that you need to keep your emotions
under control." (Id., p.341, Ls.7-10 (emphasis added).) Clearly, Kim's inability to keep her
emotions under control had no correlation to the testimony she was eliciting or the procedural
posture of the case; she just had difficulties keeping her emotions under control throughout the
proceedings generally. Notably, Kim had no involvement in eliciting what should have been the
most emotionally-laden testimony from Mr. Abdullah's family members; Mitch handled that
questioning without emotion. (31659 Tr. Vol. VIII, pp.280-94 (Haji), pp.294-315 (Dilshad),
pp.316-326 (Nichivan), pp.35-52, 355-58, 374-78 (Rahan).)

38

Finally, to explain counsels' failure to present a compelling mitigation case despite
counsels' access to numerous mitigation witnesses, the State speculates trial counsel made
strategic choices about which family members should testify. Trial counsel never said they did
so, but the State argues we should assume they did. Essentially, the State's argument is that by
limiting the number of humanizing witnesses who testified on Mr. Abdullah's behalt~ counsel
were trying to prevent the dilution of the "compelling" hour and a half of family testimony by
not offering the same "general testimony" from other witnesses. (Resp. Br. 142-43.) Again,
counsels' failure to present a compelling mitigation case was simply unreasonable and
unexplained.
Predictably, both the district court below and the State on appeal argue that because of
"the exceptionally heinous nature of the crimes for which he has been convicted, Abdullah has
not established a reasonable probability of a different result even if the additional evidence had
been presented." (Resp. Br. 144; R. 39417, pp.8511-12 ("That his family of origin loves him
pales in comparison to the facts of the case.").) In its Response, the State argues Mr. Abdullah's
crimes are "exceptionally heinous" and no amount of mitigating evidence would or could have
resulted in a sentence other than death. (See also Resp. Br. 148 ("[V]irtually no amount of
mitigation was going to overcome the aggravation stemming from the brutal acts Abdullah
perpetrated against his wife and young children .... ").) Courts have addressed similar "brutality
trumps" arguments in related contexts, observing:
Likewise, the State's stereotypical fall-back argument-that the heinous and
egregious nature of the crime would have ensured assessment of the death penalty
even absent the psychiatric testimony about future dangerousness-cannot carry the
day here. First, that argument cannot prevail without eviscerating the Supreme
Court-approved Texas "special issues" scheme. To permit a jury to impose the
death sentence solely because the facts are heinous and egregious would be to
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return to the days of inflicting capital punishment based on emotion and revenge,
supplanting altogether the questions of deliberateness and future dangerousness
which make the Texas scheme constitutional. Second, in this particular case, the
details of the crime, as horrific as they are on an absolute scale, are not
significantly more egregious than those in, for example, Vanderbilt. Except for
there being a second teenage victim here (who survived), the crimes are
amazingly parallel; yet the equally heinous facts in Vanderbilt were insufficient to
negate prejudice. Finally, our decades of experience with scores of§ 2254 habeas
cases from the death row of Texas teach an obvious lesson that is frequently
overlooked: Almost without exception, the cases we see in which conviction of
a capital crime has produced a death sentence arise from extremely
egregious, heinous, and shocking facts. But, if that were all that is required to
offset prejudicial legal error and convert it to harmless error, habeas relief
based on evidentiary error in the punishment phase would virtually never be
available, so testing for it would amount to a hollow judicial act.

Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d

1, 563 (5th Cir. 200 l) (footnote omitted) ( emphasis added)

(rejecting brutality trumps argument in Fifth Amendment context); see also Walbey v.

Quarterman, 309 Fed.Appx. 795, 804 (5 th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam) (rejecting
brutality trumps argument in context of Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, observing "Texas must do more than baldly point out the obvious, that Walbey's crime
was extremely brutal"). 13
No death sentence is inevitable. Every first degree murder is death-eligible in Idaho, even
if not sought. I.C. § 18-4003. Many murders where death was not imposed involved facts more
egregious, and offenders far more culpable than Mr. Abdullah. See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Idaho

prosecutors opting not to seek death penalty, IDAHO STATESMAN, November 3, 2009 (identifying
Ada and Elmore County cases where death was not sought and those in Ada County and Canyon
County where the State sought death but jury did not impose it, even when cases involved child

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 32.l(a)(i)-(ii), unpublished cases issued
after January 1, 2007, are citable.
13
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homicide victims); Edgar Linares, Man who Killed Nampa Couple in 2003

Life in Prison,

KTVB.com, March 20, 2010 (defendant who tied up an elderly couple in their home, stabbed
and tortured them, and then left them to die on Christmas Day in 2003, given two life sentences
without the possibility of parole)( available at http://www.ktvb.com/news/Roberts-gets-life-inprison-for-killing-Nampa-couple-88564022.html);

Brian Rogers

and

Dale

Lezon, Jurors

Sentence HPD Officer's Killer To Life, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 20, 2008 Qury imposing life
sentence rather than death upon defendant who was illegally in the country and who shot and
killed beloved Houston police officer repeatedly in the back and head); Ian Ith, "Emissary Of

Death" Sentenced To Life, SEATTLE TIMES, December 19, 2003 (reporting court's imposition of
48 consecutive life sentences upon Gary Ridgway following his guilty pleas to 48 counts of
aggravated murder); David Kocieniewski, Death On The Night Shift: The Plea; Ee-Nurse Pleads

Guilty To Killing Patients, N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 2004 (reporting defendant's guilty pleas to
intentionally killing fourteen patients, and admission to killing as many as forty-patients, with
the court imposing thirteen life sentences); 1Vloussaoui Formally Sentenced, Still Defiant, NBC
NEWS, May 4, 2006 (after guilty pleas to conspiring to kill thousands of Americans as part of the
September

11

th

attacks,

a

federal jury decided not to

impose death on the

hijacker")(available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/126l5601 #.UgHHf6yleHc).

"20 th

Simply put,

there is no such thing as an automatic death penalty, and no crime or facts are so egregious or
heinous or horrific that the death penalty is inevitable. Accordingly, the perceived brutality or
egregious nature of a particular crime is never an excuse for counsel to fail to do their job to
present a readily-available mitigation case, and is no basis for a court to deem the presentation of
a slip-shod mitigation case adequate or effective.
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xm.
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Abdullah's Claim That He Was Denied His
Sixth Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel By Counsels' Improper
Advisements Regarding His Right To Testify At The Guilt And Penalty Phase, And To Allocute
Mr. Abdullah thoroughly explained the standards governing a defendant's constitutional
right to testify and allocute in a capital case, and cited relevant portions of the record in support
of this claim. (Appellant's Br. 156-71.) Mr. Abdullah takes this opportunity to provide a limited
response to inaccuracies in the State's Response.
Incredibly, the State claims Mr. Abdullah's arguments ignore ethical mies and the Idaho
Court of Appeals' "implicit" adoption of narrative testimony in State v. Waggoner, 124 Idaho
716 (Ct.App.1993). (Resp. Br. 178 n.39.) Contrary to the State's claim, Mr. Abdullah
specifically cited to and discussed the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Waggoner and
explained why

Waggoner is of limited value under the facts and circumstances of

Mr. Abdullah' s case. (See and compare Appellant's Br. 159 (citing Waggoner and explaining its
limited utility) with Resp. Br. 178 n.39 ("Incredibly, Abdullah does not even mention Waggoner,
let alone attempt to distinguish the court of appeals' decision.").)
Moreover, the State fails to acknowledge the limited value of decisions from the Idaho
Court of Appeals in capital cases. Generally speaking, this Court has held that "[a]lthough
persuasive, Court of Appeal's decisions are not binding case law precedent in this Court." State

v. Morton, 140 Idaho 235, 238 (2004) (citing Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 757 (2002)).
Nowhere is this principle more strong than in capital cases, where the Idaho Supreme Court is
the only court vested with the authority to decide cases on appeal involving a death sentence.

See I.C. § 1-2406(1) (vesting jurisdiction over appeals from imposition of death sentences in the
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Idaho Supreme Court); LC. § 19-2827 (requiring mandatory review of death sentences by Idaho
Supreme Court and setting forth issues Idaho Supreme Court must review in capital cases).

For the reasons explained in his Appellant's Briet: trial counsels' coercive tactics and
erroneous advice deprived Mr. Abdullah of his right to effective assistance of counsel and his
constitutional right to testify and allocute. These constitutional violations, coupled with the
district court's application of a preponderance of the evidence standard to the prejudice prong of
Mr. Abdullah's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, entitle Mr. Abdullah to either a new
trial, or a remand for reconsideration of this claim applying correct standards.
XIV.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Abdullah 's Claim That His Sixth Amendment
Right To The Effective Assistance Of Counsel Was Violated By Counsels' Failure To Conduct
Adequate Voir Dire, Failure To Strike Biased Jurors For Cause And Failing To Utilize
Peremptory Strikes To Remove The Most Biased Jurors
The State clearly misunderstands Mr. Abdullah argument. The State claims Mr. Abdullah
is arguing his trial counsel were ineffective "because they failed to properly utilize the 'Colorado
Method' of selecting a jury .... " (Resp. Br. 183.) Mr. Abdullah is not arguing counsels' failure
to follow the Colorado Method itself was per se deficient. As Mr. Abdullah made extraordinarily
clear to the district court, and in his Appellant's brief, his trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to conduct adequate voir dire, failing to strike biased jurors for cause, and failing to utilize
peremptory strikes to remove the most biased jurors. Counsels' actions and inactions in voir dire
were deficient because they are contrary to the well-established standards the United States
Supreme Court has adopted for selecting death-qualified jurors, not because they are contrary to
the Colorado Method. (Appellant's Br. 171-90.)
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In an interesting twist, the State then

because the Colorado Method is only

concerned with sentencing, trial counsel correctly chose a Jury outside the strictures of the
Colorado Method because counsel were rightly interested in obtaining not guilty verdicts. (Resp.
Br. 185.) Of course, this is contrary to the State's prior assertion that trial counsel had no choice
but to concede Mr. Abdullah's presence at the scene, standing in front of his burning house with
his children inside, because the evidence of his presence in Boise was overwhelming. (Resp. Br.
168-70 ("Based upon the overwhelming nature of the state's case, Toryanskis had virtually no

other option [than concede Mr. Abdullah was in Boise at the Siesta residence at the time of the
fire].").) The State cannot, in good conscience, argue it was reasonably strategic to forego the
Colorado Method in hopes of obtaining a jury that would be friendly to a guilt-phase defense that
the State asserts had no hope to begin with.
For all of the reasons set forth in Mr. Abdullah's Appellant's Brief~ his trial counsels'
performance during voir dire and jury selection was deficient, and he was prejudiced as a result
because a biased, partial jury deliberated, found him guilty, and agreed the death penalty was not
an unjust punishment. (Appellant's Br. 171-90.) The district court's conclusions to the contrary
are erroneous.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons identified in Mr. Abdullah's Appellant's Brief and herein, Mr. Abdullah
was deprived of his right to a fair trial free of constitutional error before a fair and impartial jury.
As a result, his convictions for first degree murder, arson, three counts of attempted first degree,
and felony injury to a child must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial.

44

Alternatively, the district court's decision applying incorrect standards to Mr. Abdullah's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and summarily dismissing a majority of his postconviction claims, must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings applying
proper standards.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2014.
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